

Why is Private Equity (PE) interested in Restaurants?



PE firms hope to attain synergies

Restaurants thought to be: simple businesses, a service that everyone needs, to throw off steady, predictable, bond-like low risk cash flows

Investors demand: have need to balance their portfolios

Restaurants that franchise have low/lower needs of CAPEX, may enhance growth

Put PE investor funds (dry powder) to work

Fewer publicly traded restaurants=IPO latent demand



Restaurant Potential Returns Universe: Sources of return?

Operating Restaurants

Franchising Restaurants

Supply chain, consumer package goods (CPG),
licensing

Rationalizing (selling) assets: sum of the pieces theory

PE management fees and dividends

Exit strategy: selling to another firm (str. or PE)

Exit strategy: IPO: sell stock (equity) gradually to replace
debt and payback PE initial investment, potential stock
price appreciation



PE Firm is a risk taker, but has advantages



PE firm itself invests its own cash

PE invests its client's money

PE utilizes debt for bulk of purchase price

PE gets bulk of its return upon hitting performance goals or holding/selling to gain

PE firms can take dividends/fees out based if bank agreement/debt market and company performance warrants



Issue: How is PE Restaurant success defined?



Definitions key

Who benefits?

Who are the stakeholders: investors, PE firms, the brand itself, franchisees, employees, creditors, consumers

Data challenge: PE is private, not much data.

Sources: industry events, press services, earnings calls for some, SEC filings (S-1), other SEC filings, IPO road shows, Ch.-11/7 filings, business intel.



Tracking Universe: larger companies,
established major brands

IPO, pre-IPO, resale: assumed to
be "successful"


Ch-11/7, major restructuring: not successful

Vast majority in TBD, working status

Impossible thus far to measure all
stakeholders gains/losses



Restaurants and Private Equity Characterization of Success 1997-2012



Per press reports, publicly available data, and Pacific Management Consulting Group analysis.



PE Statistics, 1997-2012

73 deals tracking, app. \$26 Billion

Most frequently appearing: Burger King

Avg. debt at Ch-11: 7.4X (EV/EBITDA)

2005/2006 deals most challenged

Avg. debt at restructuring: 9.5X (EV/EBITDA)

Largest investor loss: Quizno's, app. \$280M

90 major brands tracking



PE Ownership Pros/Cons: too complex for bumper sticker analysis



PE is here to stay
Ability to provide capital, maturity and scope to startups
Gives companies a “time out” from hyper pressure of Wall Street, chance to get fixed

Risk is complicated
mutual support systems are broken apart
Older, declining brands may not be turnaround-able
Debt/PE dividends may undermine the company, how does the debt ever get paid off?



What could the future be?

Companies will go back and forth between public and private status more frequently

Collaboration among companies to manage bloated restaurant inventory ?

Clumps of PE firm purchases (2004-2007), (2010-2011) will affect out year market characteristics

PE restaurant staff specialists corps



Questions?



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